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1
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AS
A NORMATIVE PROBLEM

As the twenty-first century began, two major and related developments seemed to be reshaping American constitutional law. One was the
frequent invocation of theories of"originalism," claims that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of the "original" meaning it held for
those who drafted and ratified it. 1 The other was a "federalism revival," an
intensifYing effort to employ constitutional provisions to limit the powers
of the national government and protect the sovereignty of the states. The
two developments, moreover, seemed mutually supportive. The "original" relationship between nation and states-in contrast to the evolving
series of relationships that developed over the subsequent centuries-had
seen the national government exercising less extensive powers and the
states holding sway over larger areas of American life. Thus, it was hardly
surprising in the early twenty-first century that reinvigorated commitments to "originalism" and "federalism" might flourish in tandem.
Further, the growing popularity of originalism and federalism crossed
political and ideological lines. Libertarians, economic "conservatives,"
and some other elements of the post-Reagan Republican coalition aggressively advanced both. 2 Justice Antonin Scalia, for example, repeatedly
stressed the importance of preserving state sovereign immunity3 and proclaimed that all constitutional decisions should be based on "the original
meaning of the text. " 4 At the same time, many liberals, progressives, and
moderates began climbing aboard the double-teamed bandwagon. In
r999 President Bill Clinton issued an executive order that identified nine
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"Fundamental Federalism Principles" and directed federal officials to follow them in carefully scrutinizing actions that might cause "substantial direct effects on the States." He did so, the president announced, "to guarantee the division of governmental responsibilities between the national
government and the States that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution. " 5
In spite of such frequent invocations, both originalism and federalism
raised the same fundamental and deeply troublesome question of constitutional law. To what extent was either capable of providing clear and authoritative constitutional norms? Could either, in truth, provide specific
and determinative directions in resolving contested constitutional questions?
In helping to revive both originalism and federalism, the Rehnquist
Court illustrated the extent to which the two ostensible norms provided
uncertain and ambiguous directions. In the years after 1992 five of its justices began frequently to invoke "the essential principles of federalism"
and the "original understanding of the Constitution" held by the "founding generation. " 6 When they did so, the Court immediately split, fragmenting badly in a train of important and potentially far-reaching decisions. Repeatedly, the other four justices dissented, often in sweeping and
sometimes defiant terms? Indeed, after protesting a series of decisions
that limited the power of Congress and expanded the sovereign immunity
of the states, the four boldly announced their "continuing dissent" from
the "aggressive" new federalism jurisprudence that made the Court "the
champion of States' rights. " 8 The dissenters, however, did not invariably
agree among themselves and on occasion broke ranks on federalism issues.9 Far more striking and revealing, however, was the fact that the five
justices in the "originalist" and "pro-federalism" majority also divided
among themselves and did so with increasing frequency. 10 In Idaho v.
Coeur d)Alene Tribe of Idaho) for example, two of the five explained and
applied their view of the "basic principles of federalism," 11 while the other
three wrote separately to reject the analysis of the first two as "flawed in
several rcspects." 12 Similarly, dealing with the scope of national power in
another case, one of five chided the other four for not adopting "a standard more consistent with the original understanding." 13 Indeed, in one
recent decision four of the Rehnquist Court's five "pro-federalism" jus-
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tices voted to assert national authority and thereby limit state power, while
the fifth joined the four so-called nationalist justices in limiting national
authority and expanding state power. 14
Such swings, divisions, and inconsistencies were hardly unprecedented.
Over the decades, Americans had disagreed continuously and often passionately about the nature of their federal system. Their disagreements had
begun at the Constitution's birth, moreover, and they were almost invariably rooted in conflicting visions of its "original" meaning.
It was true that when the Constitution was ratified, some of its provisions carried relatively clear and accepted meanings. There was no dispute
that the new charter established a central government with three distinct
branches and ordained that each would have certain characteristics and
powers, nor was there any dispute that it also limited those national
branches in various ways. Equally, there was no dispute that the Constitution confirmed the existence of the states and made them constituent elements of the new central government, and there was no dispute that it also
limited the powers of those states and made federal law "supreme." The
widespread acceptance of that basic institutional structure-supported by
a broad cultural consensus among the nation's elite, long experience with
the practice of representative government among the people, and the immense prestige of the man elected to serve as the nation's first presidentenabled the new central government to organize itself and begin operations. That bare initial achievement, James Madison believed, was by itself
"a miracle." 1 5
At the same time, however, disagreements about the powers of those
levels and branches and about their proper working relationships erupted
immediately, and the earliest and most explosive raged over the disputed
line between state and national authority. Over the course of the following
centuries those controversies seldom flagged. Given that history of congenital disputation, the current revival of original ism and federalism provokes two paramount and related questions. 16 One goes to the Constitution itself: What, in fact, was the "original" nature of the federal structure
it established? The other goes to the persisting disagreement about the
way that federal structure was to function: Why did Americans fight over
its proper operation so immediately, so continuously, so broadly, and so
fiercely?
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This inquiry seeks, and proposes, answers to those two questions. On
the first, it concludes that the "original" federal structure was marked by
four inherent characteristics. It was doubly blurred, fractionated, instrumental, and contingent. The claim is not that those four characteristics
were parts of any original "meaning" or "understanding" but, rather, that
they were built-in characteristics of the constitutional structure and that
they existed independent of any intentions or understandings of the
founders. On the second question, the inquiry concludes that those four
characteristics made the original federal structure intrinsically elastic, dynamic, and underdetermined. Those qualities made constitutional disagreements about federalism inevitable, and they made most of those disagreements-insofar as Americans sought to settle them by reference to
some "original" constitutional meaning or understanding- inherently
unresolvable. Hence, immediate, continuous, broad, and fierce disputation.
The inquiry argues, then, that any claim that the "original" nature of
American federalism can serve as a specifically directive norm- such as
Chief Justice William Rehnquist's invocation of "the Framers' carefully
crafted balance of power between the States and the National Government"17 -is simply mistaken. No such "true" or "correct" balance ever
existed. 18 Equally important, the inquiry also argues that, even had there
been some true "original" balance, the constitutional structure the
founders established was inherently incapable of maintaining it. To understand American federalism, in other words, one must consider far more
than constitutional text, structural relationships, and "originalist" sources;
one must also understand federalism's inherent elasticity and dynamism.
Stated so briefly, those conclusions require three points of immediate
clarification. First, it is essential to distinguish between the federal "structure" and tl1e working processes, or evolving "systems," of American
federalism. The Constitution's federal structure-the existence of diverse
levels and branches of government with distinctive institutional characteristics and powers-was both evident and uncontested. The way that structure was to fimction in practice-how the levels and branches would operate, how far their powers would reach, and how they would interact with
one another-was not. The doubly blurred, fr-actionated, instrumental,
and contingent nature of the constitutional structure, then, had its para-
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mount effect not on the federal structure itself but on the structure's operations, on the working processes of what came to be called the federal
system. Second, the inquiry's conclusions are not based on any theory or
assumption about the general "indeterminacy" oflaw or language. To the
contrary, the inquiry assumes that words, rules, concepts, and principles
may convey meanings that are fairly determinable either generally or in
specific contexts. Its conclusions, then, are based not on general theories
of language or meaning but on empirical evidence from the nation's history. Third, those conclusions do not purport to apply necessarily to other
areas of constitutional law. The inquiry's focus is narrow and specific. It
concentrates on only one aspect of the U .S. Constitution-its federal
structure and its resulting federal system of government-and attempts to
answer only questions about that particular constitutional issue.
Specifically, then, the inquiry suggests that the Constitution neitl1er
gave the federal structure any single proper shape as an operating system of
government nor mandated any particular and timeless balance among its
components. It suggests, rather, that the Constitution established a structure that accepted certain types of change as natural and desirable. It concludes, then, that there was no "original" intention, understanding, or
meaning that prescribed either a single and true federal system or a single
and true set of relationships among the structure's constituent parts;
further, it concludes that, even had such a "true" system existed in some
"original" intent or understanding, the governmental structure the founders established could not have preserved it unchanged over time.
Further, the inquiry suggests that the workings of the federal structure
cannot be understood without examining the separation of powers at tl1e
national level. Altl1ough federalism and separation of powers were different concepts embodied in different institutional arrangements and subject
to different sets of incentives and limitations, tl1ey were nonetheless inextricably intertwined in their operations. 19 Both constitutional law and
national politics were shaped by their continuous, shifting, and varied interactions. The idea of American federalism as a simple binary division between "the nation" and "tl1e states," then, is an artificial abstraction unrelated to the actual history and operations of the nation's constitutional
system.
The separation of powers vastly multiplied the complexities and uncer-
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tainties of American constitutional federalism for two readily apparent reasons. First, the existence of three separate national branches meant that the
central government would sometimes be riven by internal conflicts and
consequently unable to articulate and enforce consistent and unified "national" policies. The attitude of the three national branches toward the
states and the federal structure would vary and often conflict, sometimes
sharply and profoundly. Second, the constitutional provisions specifYing
the powers of the national branches were, like the provisions dividing state
and national powers, imprecise and incomplete. The claim that the Constitution established an "assigned balance of responsibility and power
among the three [national] branches," 20 in other words, is as mistaken as
the claim that the Constitution established a "carefully crafted balance"
between states and nation. Thus, the inquiry argues, institutional divisions
and constitutional ambiguities in the separation of national powers radically compounded the divisions and ambiguities that were inherent in the
relationship between nation and states.
The inquiry argues that the Constitution did create a governmental
structure with an essential and unalterable core, but it suggests that the
core lay not in any "assigned" or "carefully crafted" balance but rather in a
dynamic combination of three interrelated elements that allow a range of
acceptable permutations. The first element was the principle of divided but
interconnected and potentially "checking" powers. The second was the institutional specification of that principle along two crosscutting and internally divided dimensions, multiple individual units on the state level and
separated powers on the national level. The third was the moral and political ideal that the principle of divided powers and its institutional embodiment were designed to serve, that of a free, just, and self-governing society.21
Further, the inquiry suggests that ideas and attitudes about the federal
structure and its "original" form have invariably been shaped not simply
by the Constitution and accepted "originalist" sources but also by the personal views of the individuals who held those ideas and attitudes. It does
not deny that many individuals believed passionately in their various conceptions of the federal structure or that many also believed sincerely that
their conceptions were mandated by the Constitution itself. The inquiry
argues only that their conceptions could not, in fact, have come solely
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from those authoritative sources. The inquiry suggests, rather, that those
who held such beliefs were either unable or unwilling to recognize the
ways in which their personal values, interests, and assumptions shaped the
particular meanings they attributed to the federal structure. 22 The inquiry
counsels, consequently, that all specific prescriptions allegedly derived
from either the federal structure or "originalist" ideas about that structure
must be evaluated not just in terms of formal constitutional arguments but
also in light of the particular values and interests of those who advance
them and, most important, in light of the practical implications and social
consequences that the prescriptions would likely entail if accepted.
Many scholars, of course, have recognized that personal views shape interpretations of the Constitution. 23 The inquiry extends that insight in
two ways. First, it suggests that, with respect to American constitutional
federalism, such subjectivism is inherent and unavoidable. The Constitution does not establish any single and true balance in the federal structure,
and the structure itself is, in any event, too elastic, dynamic, and underdetermined to sustain any such unchanging balance. Thus, specific normative interpretations offederalism must necessarily be rooted in the personal
values and interests of their advocates. Second, and consequently, the inquiry suggests that sound constitutional reasoning on federalism issues
must move beyond invocations of general "principles" and "original"
meanings and ground itself on specific, pragmatic, and empirically based
analyses of the operations of the federal structure and the likely practical
consequences involved in accepting any particular interpretation of its nature and limits. Focusing on such careful pragmatic analyses, it argues,
would help cabin the inherent, if often ignored or denied, subjectivism involved in deciding federalism issues. It would force interpreters to recognize and account more fully for the interests, purposes, assumptions, and
values that shape their views, and it would help channel decision making
along lines more likely to achieve the substantive goals of the nation's constitutional enterprise. 24
Finally, the inquiry suggests that the federal structure is best understood
not as a freestanding institutional construct, or as a simple embodiment of
an "original" architectural blueprint, but as an integral part of the collective constitutional enterprise of the American people, the concerted intergenerational effort to realize and sustain the ideal of a free, just, and self-
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governing society. The continuing legitimacy of the nation's constitutional government, after all, derives not from any original social contract
capable of binding later generations and providing them with specific directions. Rather, it derives from other, and far more compelling, sources:
the continuing popular judgment that the Constitution embodies both
political and moral wisdom and the inspiring but sobering fact that wethe current people of the United States-are the inheritors and beneficiaries of the work of successive generations that created, defended, and interpreted the Constitution in their collective efforts to secure the "Blessings of Liberty" for themselves and their posterity, that is, for us and for
our own posterity. 2 5
In reaching and explaining its conclusions, the inquiry proceeds in three
parts. The first, comprising Chapters 2 through 5, examines the four intrinsic characteristics of the "original" federal structure. The second, comprising Chapters 6 through 9, explores some of the consequential dynamics that resulted from those original characteristics. Finally, the third part,
Chapter 10, reflects on the more general significance of the inquiry's analysis and conclusions.
In Part I, Chapter 2 considers the structure's intrinsically doubly
blurred nature, the fact that the Constitution divided power between national and state governments in a manner that was both ambivalent and
ambiguous. The division was ambivalent because the Constitution gave
the two levels of government overlapping powers and responsibilities in
conducting republican government and protecting republican values. It
thereby ensured that they would exist in tension and that, on disputed issues, both could claim to stand for the nation's highest moral and political
principles. The division was ambiguous because the Constitution failed to
identify the boundaries between the two levels with clarity and completeness, thereby ensuring that each would frequently have grounds to dispute
the otl1er's autl1ority. From the beginning, then, the two levels were placed
in tension with neither their realms nor their relationships adequately prescribed.
Chapter 3 explores the structure's fractionated nature. The Constitution did not create a simple binary structure but rather one that was manysided and multi-linked. It divided the national side into three parts, and for
good measure bifurcated one of those three parts into two differently con-
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stituted and differently empowered halves. Similarly, the Constitution embraced an even more fragmented division on the state side, encompassing
many separate entities, providing for their steady multiplication over time,
and allowing each to subdivide into as many local governing units as it
~hose. Thus, the Constitution created a structure that loosely and flexibly
lmked three separate and quite different national branches-one of which
was itself divided internally-with an expanding multitude of diverse and
often conflicting state and local government units. It was a complexly fractionated structure that proved inherently dynamic, generating over time a
virtually infinite number of varied and shifting geographical and instituti~r:al alliances, all of which crosscut the Constitution's formal binary
dJvrde between "national" and "state" governments. That fractionated
structure gave birth to a kaleidoscopic interstate politics that further
blurred the boundaries of authority in the federal structure by pressing
new and shifting meanings onto its doubly blurred constitutional lines and
by preventing either "the states" or "the nation" from acting consistently
and cohesively as unified entities to maintain any timeless division between
their powers.
Chapter 4 examines the intrinsically instrumentalist nature of the federal
structure. The founders assumed that ambition and self-interest drove
"factions" to exploit government and that mere "parchment" lines would
be ~nsufficient to block factional aggrandizements. Only purposive human
:ctrons could check other purposive_ human actions. Consequently, they
_es_rgned the federal structure as an mstrument to control factions by diVIdmg power among diverse levels and branches capable of "checking"
one another's abuses and aggrandizements. Providing the framework,
components, and incentives for such purposive and responsive actions
then, the federal structure was inherently an instrument of human goal;
and
b.·
:
am Ittons. Its doubly blurred lines, however, did not adequately specIfy the conditions under which one level or branch was properly to "check"
an~ther, and it consequently allowed factions ample leeway in justifying
thetr efforts to exploit the power of whichever governmental components
they happened to influence or control. "Checking," tl1en, quickly proved
to be but one of many possible forms of response open to the structure's
~omponents. Others included acquiescing, deflecting, adapting, facilitatmg, exploiting, and extending. That wide range of possible responses
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compounded the structure's inherent elasticity and dynamism; and, as
those who controlled its various components acted and responded in diverse ways, they created shifting sets of institutional interrelationships that
altered the powers of the various levels and branches and, in the process,
reshaped the operations of the federal structure.
Chapter 5 considers the structure's contingent nature, the fact that its
lines of division were dependent on constitutional provisions that incorporated numerous principles of change. The chapter identifies the ways in
which the Constitution mandated some changes, authorized others, and
invited yet more. Thus, as the nation and its surrounding world environment evolved, some changes were compelled by constitutional mandates,
others flowed from constitutionally authorized choices, and still others resulted from the new significance that changes in the world environment
gave to many constitutional provisions. As those varied changes occurred,
new matrices of pressures, conditions, and assumptions remolded the federal structure. Whether the Constitution's provisions mandated, authorized, or merely invited change, they combined to make the federal structure inherently malleable and adaptive .
Those four characteristics, the section concludes, explain the dynamic
and underdetermined nature of American federalism. They created a governing structure that was marked by far too many ambiguities and elasticities to define any single and "correct" balance between states and nation.
It was a structure composed offar too many dynamic and interconnecting
parts, all of which were themselves both mutable and manipulable, to sustain any particular and timeless balance.
Part II considers some of the specific consequences that those four characteristics brought to the federal structure and the nation's constitutional
enterprise. Chapter 6 examines the volatile and pragmatic interstate politics that grew out of the structure's fractionated nature. Although political
organizations and interests worked within the Constitution's binary division, they also exploited it ruthlessly and methodically. As ever-expanding
numbers and varieties of interests clashed in their efforts to exploit the different levels and branches of government, they generated ever-multiplying
and ever-shifting sets of interstate alliances and counteralliances that continuously stretched and reshaped the doubly blurred lines between "national" and "state" authority. Their practices nourished ideas, interests,
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coalitions, expectations, and interconnections that overflowed the Constitution's binary categorization and forged a kaleidoscopic interstate politics
whose pressures repeatedly remolded the workings of the federal structure
and shifted its lines of operative authority.
Chapter 7 focuses on the federal structure's institutional components
themselves, especially its three national branches. The chapter examines
the ways in which the structure's intrinsic characteristics enabled and encouraged those institutions to reshape themselves as they adapted to
changes in the world around tl1em, including changes that were occurring
in the other levels and branches of government. Exercising broad and often undefined powers, and enjoying substantial discretion over their own
internal structure and operations, the national branches expanded their
distinctive powers in divergent and sometimes conflicting ways, while
each evolved into a distinctive and complex set of interlocking- and quite
imperfectly integrated- bureaucracies. Over the years they repeatedly reshaped their actions and readjusted their relationships, and their effortssometimes separately and sometimes in combination-altered the operations of the individual branches and stretched the boundaries of their
powers. Indeed, in the early twenty-first century not one of the federal
branches remained the same in size, operation, organization, significance,
or scope of authority as it had been in the nineteenth century or even
much of the twentieth century, let alone as it had been "originally" in
1789.
Chapter 8 examines one of the Constitution's paramount ambiguities,
its failure to specifY a mechanism for enforcing divisions between national
and state power. It explores the varied theories that the founding generation launched, the intensifYing disputes that only a Civil War could begin
to resolve, and the subsequent debates that increasingly focused on
whether the U.S. Supreme Court could and should enforce the constitutional division between state and national power. Questions about the
Court's proper role, like many other questions about the federal structure,
went unresolved by the founders. The resulting uncertainties led to an unending train of disputes that could be settled by neither the language of
the Constitution nor the "original" views of the founders but only by the
politics, ideologies, and practicalities of their respective times.
Chapter 9 moves to a broader level and considers some of the ways in
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which general ideas about the federal structure and the Constitution
changed over the centuries. It focuses, in particular, on changes in ideas
about the "values" and "nature" of federalism itself, and it suggests that
constitutional commentators have consistently been unable to transcend
the uncertainties and dynamics tl1at were rooted in the federal structure's
four inherent characteristics. The chapter concludes that normative theo ries founded on interpretations of the "values" and "nature" of federalism
reflected rather tl1an resolved those uncertainties and dynamics and that,
as those underlying ideas and assumptions evolved, both the understanding and operation of the federal structure evolved as well.
Finally, Part III, Chapter 10, attempts to syntl1esize the lessons to be
drawn from a recognition of the elastic, dynamic, and underdetermined
nature of the federal structure. It offers no specific normative tl1eory of
federalism and suggests that tl1e Constitution neither mandates nor requires any such specific theory. It closes not in resignation or despair, however, but in hope and commitment. If the inquiry's conclusions are sound,
the chapter suggests, it does not mean that the nation's constitutional enterprise lacks either understandable norms or, in at least some of its provisions, relatively clear and guiding rules and principles. It means only that
the Constitution itself, witl1 or without the aid of "originalist" sources,
could not and did not provide specifically directive norms capable of resolving the contested issues of federalism that divided Americans after
1787. It also means that they cannot do so in tl1e future. That ever-present
and ineluctable burden, the inquiry concludes, rests on each succeeding
generation of Americans, the very posterity on whose behalf the found ers- and, of course, the succeeding generations who broadened the concept of national citizenship to include those originally excluded- sought
to act.

